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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between wage formation and the political colour of the 
government in an economy with centralized wage bargaining. Ideological, organizational 
and personal ties between the central trade union and the social democratic political party 
suggest that the trade union may behave significantly different in wage negotiations 
under a social democratic than under a conservative government.  Using time series data 
for Norway, we estimate that changing from a conservative to a social democratic central 
government significantly reduces manufacturing wages and makes wages more 
responsive to unemployment. This result is consistent with a wage bargaining model 
augmented by political preferences of the union leaders and suggests that the effect of 
bargaining coordination depends on the political colour of the government. The estimated 
effects are both robust with respect to model specification and stable over time. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large theoretical and empirical literature has investigated the relationship between 
wage growth and wage setting institutions.  An influential view, first formulated in the 
seminal paper by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), is that both fully decentralized and fully 
centralized wage bargaining provides wage restraint compared to the intermediate case 
with sectoral or regional bargaining. 
 
While bargaining institutions themselves affect outcomes, the political environment 
within which these institutions operate may affect the way the bargaining parties (the 
central union and employer organization) behave in negotiations. In this spirit, political 
scientists have suggested that encompassing trade unions will moderate wage demands 
and internalize externalities in wage setting only to the extent that the trade union will get 
a share of the ‘cake’ to be induced by this moderation. The trade union movement and the 
Social Democratic (SD) parties are assumed to have common ideological goals, and the 
union have more confidence that a SD government will implement such a redistribution 
policy. The seminal paper by Lange and Garrett (1985) set out the main ideas and provide 
cross-country empirical evidence that the combination of SD government and centralized 
bargaining generates better macroeconomic performance in terms of inflation and growth 
compared to decentralized bargaining under conservative governments.  
 
The present paper contributes to the literature by combining the insights from political 
science research with wage equations in the Layard-Nickell tradition. Most existing 
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research on the relationship between macroeconomic performance and political colour of 
government is based on cross country evidence. While cross-country research on this 
issue is clearly important, it has some important limitations. Countries may well differ in 
several important circumstances other than wage bargaining system and government 
type.  Further, appropriate definitions of government colour may differ across countries 
and easily interpretable empirical country independent measures may be hard to define. 
Even in a situation where SD-parties are easy to define, definition of government type 
gets problematic in countries where these parties frequently form coalition governments 
with more conservative or center parties. Finally, indexes of actual wage setting systems 
with respect to centralization, varies considerably between studies (Mares, 2004). 
 
An alternative to cross-country studies which is used in this paper is to extend well 
established and robust models of wage formation in a single country with variables 
capturing the type of government. Norway provides a useful case for such an 
investigation for several reasons. The institutions of centralized bargaining have been 
very stable throughout the post-war period, compared to many other countries, see Kahn 
(1998) and Padovano and Galli (2003). Further, the social democratic party in Norway 
has never been involved in coalition governments and implies that we can construct a 
relatively clean measure of government type.1  We estimate structural wage equations 
using time series data for Norwegian manufacturing wages for the period 1968:1 to 
2000:4, covering a period with both several shifts in government type and relatively large 
variation in important macroeconomic indicators as wage growth and unemployment. 
                                                 
1 After the national election in September 2005, the Social Democratic party formed a coalition with the 
Center party and the Socialist Left party, but this event is outside the sample used in the present study. 
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The main issues will be to test whether or not changing from a conservative to a SD 
government affect the wage level as well as wage responsiveness to unemployment. We 
also investigate the stability of the relationship between wages and political colour of the 
government, and test the robustness of the results reported in Johansen and Strøm (1997) 
based on a rather short time period. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses in more details the 
theoretical and empirical background for our hypotheses. Section 3 contains data 
description and presents the empirical specification. Section 4 gives the empirical results 
while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis 
 
The point of departure is the large theoretical and empirical literature concerning the 
importance of labour market institutions and macroeconomic performance. The earlier 
studies like McCallum (1983), Tarantelli (1983), and Bruno and Sachs (1985) concluded 
that centralized bargaining had favourable effects on performance. Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) questioned these results, showing that countries with either completely centralized 
bargaining or a completely decentralized bargaining system, performed better that 
countries with bargaining at the intermediate level.  Recent evidence in Nunziata (2005) 
suggests that bargaining coordination may offset the adverse effects of unions since 
coordination have both a negative direct effect on wage costs and makes wages more 
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responsive to unemployment.2 Evidence from Norway and Sweden in Barkbu et al. 
(2003) suggest that bargaining coordination is a multidimensional issue and that the 
actual impact on wage moderation depends on the degree of worker side coordination, 
firm side coordination and the degree of active income policy.3  
 
Our approach is to extend this line of research and we hypothesize that the political 
colour of the government may influence the impact from bargaining coordination. An 
important feature of the Scandinavian countries and other countries with a centralized 
bargaining system is the close ties between the trade union movement and the SD parties 
(Rødseth and Holden, 1990, p 238). The possible implications of this relationship have 
largely been neglected by economists. Notable exceptions are Moene et al. (1993) and 
Detken and Gärtner (1992, 1993). 
 
While economists have usually focused on the ability of centralized bargaining 
institutions to internalize externalities in decentralized wage setting, political scientists 
have long emphasized that the benefits from centralized bargaining will only occur under 
certain political circumstances. Lange and Garrett (1985, 1987), Garrett and Lange (1986, 
1989), Alvarez et al. (1991), Beck et al. (1993) and Garrett (1998) argue that an 
encompassing trade union will moderate wage demands and internalize externalities in 
wage setting only to the extent that the trade union will get a share of the ‘cake’ to be 
induced by this moderation. The trade union movement and the social democratic parties 
                                                 
2 See Layard et al. (1993, Ch. 9), Nickell (1997), Nunziata (2002) and the survey by Flanagan (1999) for 
further evidence. 
3 Recent studies also suggest that centralized wage setting has a strong effect on wage compression 
(Wallerstein, 1999). 
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are assumed to have common ideological goals, and the union have more confidence that 
a SD government will implement such a redistribution policy, cf. Detken and Gärtner 
(1992, 1993). They also provide cross-country evidence that SD governments generate 
wage moderation. In Norway, the former LO leader Konrad Nordahl recommended a 
“moderation contract” where LO was willing to accept wage moderation in exchange for 
a future welfare state (Nordahl, 1945). In the Scandinavian countries, there are also a 
number of examples that a person is a union boss one day and a minister in a SD 
government the next (Rødseth and Holden, 1990, p. 238). Thus, in these countries, union 
leaders may also have personal advantages of having a SD government. 
 
The present paper contributes to this literature by offering an empirical analysis of wage 
formation in Norwegian manufacturing. Most of the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between economic performance and political colour of the government cited 
above relies on cross-section time-series evidence from OECD-countries. While cross-
country models are clearly valuable in producing evidence on this issue, these models 
also have some important shortcomings. First, the cross-country studies in most cases 
investigate the effect of political colour of the central government and degree of 
bargaining centralization on broad measures of macroeconomic performance like GDP-
growth and price inflation. Since wage setting is the key mechanism in providing these 
relationships, a more direct and natural approach is to study the pure effect of these 
institutional features on wage development. Second, countries may differ in several 
circumstances other than wage bargaining system and political colour of the government, 
and to the extent that the level and changes over time in such features are not captured in 
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the model, it is a real possibility that the estimated effects are plagued with omitted 
variable bias. Examples are different development in economic open-ness and exposure 
to energy prices. Third, it is not always clear how to provide definitions of political 
colour of the government and degree of bargaining centralization which is meaningful 
and consistent across countries.  Fourth, a usual assumption in cross country models is 
that the parameters in the estimated equations are constant across countries. While this 
restriction is often necessary to impose due to limited sample size in the time dimension 
in cross-country data sets, it is nevertheless rather unlikely to be fulfilled in reality.  
 
An alternative approach to the multi-country analyses is to base the investigation on well-
established and robust models of wage formation in a single country with stable 
bargaining institutions over time and extend these models with political variables. This is 
our empirical strategy in this paper, and the main issues will be to test whether or not 
Norwegian wages are affected by a change from a SD to a conservative central 
government, and whether or not wage responsiveness to unemployment depends on the 
colour of the central government.  
 
Norway provides an interesting case with a fairly stable centralized bargaining regime 
throughout the whole post-WW-2 period, while other countries denoted as centralized 
wage setting countries such as Sweden which experienced a substantial decentralization 
in the 1980’s, see Hibbs and Locking (2000) and Kahn (1998). Earlier evidence provided 
by Johansen and Strøm (1997) suggest that a SD government has a substantial wage 
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moderation effect in the manufacturing industry.4 This evidence was based on a rather 
short time period (annual data 1964 – 1991), with limited variation in key variables such 
as wage growth and unemployment. Our present paper extends the time period 
throughout the 1990’s which make it possible to test the robustness of our earlier results 
with respect to the inclusion of a period with relatively large swings in the unemployment 
rate. As one objection to our story is that the ideology of the bigger political parties in 
many countries seems quite similar and has approached each other through time, we test 
whether the effect of having a SD government has been reduced over time. 
 
Some multi-country analyses investigate how labour market institutions affect the degree 
of wage responsiveness to unemployment. Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 9) and Nunziata 
(2005) report results which indicate that the unemployment effect on wages increases 
with the degree of centralization and coordination. One may argue that also the 
importance of centralization for wage responsiveness depends on the political colour of 
the government. A key innovation in the present paper will be to test whether or not wage 
responsiveness to unemployment is higher under a SD government. Such an investigation 
seems worthwhile for at least two reasons. First, if wage responsiveness to 
unemployment is higher under a SD government, the output stability with respect to 
exogenous shocks is higher under such governments than more conservative or center 
governments. Second, such an interaction effect from SD-government may add to the 
lower equilibrium unemployment already implied by the level effect on wages.  
                                                 
4 The empirical results in that paper indicate that changing from a conservative to a SD central government 
significantly reduces wage growth in the Norwegian manufacturing sector where LO has played a major 
role, whereas we find no direct effect of changing central government in the private service sector, which is 
less unionized and has a larger share of trade unions not affiliated to LO. 
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3. Data and empirical specification 
 
In this study we use quarterly data from the national account statistics for the period 
1968:1 to 2000:4 for manufacturing wages, product prices and productivity. The wage 
rate is defined by wage costs per hours worked whereas the product price is defined by 
the factor income deflator. Manufacturing productivity is defined by value added at 
constant factor prices divided by hours worked. 
 
The modelling strategy will be to formulate a general equilibrium correction model for 
manufacturing wages, ,tw  that serves as a starting point for testing and further 
simplification. The general version of the wage equation is based on previous empirical 
research on Norwegian wages using quarterly or annual data, and takes the form5 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )4 4 44Δ xβ Ut t tt tw w p pr cpi p f STOP SOC constα γ δ λ− −Δ = − − − + − + + + +  (1) 
 
The equilibrium correction term, ( ) 4tw p pr −− − , is the log of the wage share where p is 
the log of product prices and pr the log of labour productivity. The term ( ) 4tcpi p −− , is 
the log-transformed wedge between consumer prices, cpi, and producer prices. The long 
run level part of the model includes current and lagged values of the unemployment rate. 
The term ( )Uf  contains both the log-transformed unemployment rate and the inverted 
square of unemployment taking possible non-linearities into account; cf. the results in 
                                                 
5 See Bårdsen et al. (2004) and Nymoen (1989, 1991) for results using quarterly data and Johansen (1995, 
1997) and Johansen and Strøm (1997) for results using annual time series. 
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Johansen (1995, 1997). The short-run part, 4Δ x , includes current and lagged annual 
growth rates of the two prices, productivity, the income tax rate and payroll taxes. 
Changes in normal working time, 4 ,tnhΔ  are included to control for short-run 
compensation effects of reduced normal hours, whereas the composite dummy variable, 
STOPt, is included to control for the effects of the wage and price freeze 1978-79, and the 
wage law 1988-89. Finally, to test whether or not wage pressure is lower under a SD 
government, we include a dummy variable, SOCt, equal to 1 if the SD party is in office 
and 0 otherwise. In all, there have been eight changes from a SD to conservative 
government, or from a conservative to a SD government during our sample period.6 
 
The next section presents empirical results based on the general specification and 
parsimonious versions.7 To test whether or not wage responsiveness to labour market 
conditions depends on the colour of the central government, we estimate versions of the 
wage equation expanded with an interaction term between the social democratic dummy 
variable, SOC, and the unemployment rate. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Basic results 
We first estimated the unrestricted version of the wage equation. As shown in Table 1, 
the estimated short run effect of the SD dummy variable is -0.012 and statistically 
significant from zero whereas the long run estimate is -0.044. 
 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for detailed definitions and sources. 
7 Results based on alternative specifications are documented in Mydland (2004). 
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Detailed results for a parsimonious version of the general wage equation which only 
includes variables with statistically significant effects, are reported in Table 2, cf. Model 
1. The model is a valid simplification as an F-test of 35 restrictions imposed to the 
general model is well below the critical value (p-value = 0.64). Also, the diagnostic test 
statistics indicate that the model is well specified.  
 
The estimated short run effect of the SD dummy variable is -0.010 and highly significant 
with a t-value of 4.16. The derived long run effect based on the estimates in Model 1 is –
0.033 which means that permanently changing from a bourgeois to a SD government will 
reduce manufacturing wages by 3.3 percent. This effect is above the corresponding 
estimate in Johansen and Strøm (1997) who report a long run effect of 2.3 percent. 
Interestingly, when Model 1 is estimated using data for the period 1968:1 to 1991:4, the 
long run effect is 2.2 percent.  
 
Our result is strictly opposite to the evidence for Greece presented in Alogoskofis and 
Phillipopoulos (1992) who estimate Phillips-curves augmented with the government 
variable. Their results indicate that wage growth is significantly higher under a socialist 
as compared with a conservative government, a finding which may be interpreted as 
support of the partisan theory, cf. Hibbs (1992). 
 
Turning to the effects of economic variables we first note that most estimates are in 
accordance with previous empirical results for Norwegian wages, cf. Bårdsen et al. 
(2004), Johansen (1995, 1997) and Nymoen (1989, 1991).The estimate of the equilibrium 
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correction term, ,w p pr− −  is negative and statistically significant whereas the estimates 
of both log unemployment and the inverted square are significant from zero. These 
results imply that the Phillips curve is rejected, and the long run wage curve given by  
 
 ( ) 20.208 0.056 0.020 0.033w p pr cpi p u U SOC const−− − = − − + − +  (2) 
 
is rather steep for low levels of unemployment. The long run part also contains a 
significant estimate of relative prices which means that the consumer price level affects 
the long run wage path while the long run elasticity of the product price is below unity.  
 
The short run part of the model contains a significant effect of lagged wage changes 
which can be interpreted as nominal wage rigidity. The short run effects of product prices 
and productivity are small whereas the compensation effects of consumer price inflation 
and reduced working time are more substantial. Finally, we note a significant wage 
dampening effect of the income policy dummy, STOP, which may be an important 
control for identifying the partial effect of government type. 
 
The next issue will be to test whether or not wage responsiveness to unemployment is 
affected by changing the colour of the central government. We therefore expand Model 1 
with an interaction term between the SD dummy variable and the log-transformed 
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unemployment rate. The interaction term is given by ( )3t tSOC u u−× − , where the term 
within parenthesis is the deviation of log unemployment from the sample mean.8  
 
Model 2 in Table 2 reports results for the expanded wage equation. The level effect of the 
SD dummy variable is unaffected whereas the estimate of the interaction term is negative 
and highly significant from zero.9 The estimate of the interaction term is substantial, and 
implies that the effect of log unemployment is more than two times as large under a SD 
central government, than otherwise. This conclusion remains unchanged also when the 
inverted square of unemployment is excluded.10 Taken literally, this implies that the 
economy’s own ability to adjust to shocks is higher under SD-governments than under 
more right wing or center governments.   
 
The estimates of most economic variables are barely affected; the most important change 
being the estimate of relative prices which can also be seen from the derived long run 
solution given by  
 
( )
( )
20.394 0.042 0.027 0.030
0.055
w p pr cpi p u U SOC
SOC u u const
−− − = − − + −
− × − +  (3) 
 
                                                 
8 We use deviation from sample mean of log unemployment to make comparison with the results for Model 
1 easier.  
9 Strictly speaking, the estimate of SOC is unaffected when 3 .tu u− =  
10 The estimate of 3tu −  = -0.013 and the estimate of ( )3t tSOC u u− −  = -0.014 when the inverted square is 
excluded. 
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Robustness of results 
 
While the evidence so far clearly suggest that SD governments implies wage moderation, 
we now present several robustness checks on this conclusion. We ask whether the 
estimated effect may represent active income policy, other dimensions of government and 
investigate the stability of the relationship over time and across different definitions of 
the unemployment variable. 
 
Active income policy 
One potential mechanism behind the estimated effect of the SD dummy variable may be 
that it represents the effect of income policy since a SD central government is more likely 
to use an active income policy. Although the income policy dummy, STOP, control for 
such effect, we now investigate this issue in more details. We first estimate Model 2 
without any control for income policy, i.e.: we exclude the composite dummy variable. 
Thereafter, we include twelve separate dummy variables for every quarter with any kind 
of active income policy. Somewhat surprisingly, Table 1 shows that the estimates of both 
SOC and the interaction term are almost entirely unaffected by this experiment. This 
evidence suggests that differences across government type in the propensity to use active 
income policies do not explain the relationship between wages and government type.   
 
Stability over time 
In order to investigate the stability of the estimated effects, we estimated Model 2 using 
data for the period 1968:1 - 1991:4. The results reported in Table 1 shows that the 
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estimated sub sample effects are marginally larger than the full sample estimates, but the 
differences are very small. Further evidence of stability of Model 2 over time is presented 
in Figure 1 and 2. Figure 2 shows that the equation standard error varies little and there 
are no obvious outliers. Moreover, the recursive Chow-statistics looks very comfortable. 
Figure 2 reports recursive estimates with ±  2 estimated standard errors of the equilibrium 
correction term, the unemployment variables, the SD dummy, and the interaction term. 
All of these estimates are reasonably stable, and the estimates of both SOC and the 
interaction term are always significantly below zero. Hence, our conclusions that having 
a SD central government both dampen wage pressure, and makes wages more responsive 
to unemployment, seems robust to changes in the estimation period. In Section 2 we 
discussed the possibility that the importance of having a SD central government has been 
reduced over time.  Our empirical results, and particularly the tests of stability over time, 
suggest that this is not the case. 
 
Alternative definitions of unemployment 
So far we have used open unemployment as the key labour market tightness variable, 
neglecting any effect of active labour market policy. If expanding labour market 
programs has a wage dampening effect, and the SD central government is more likely to 
use active labour market policies, the estimates presented above may be biased due to 
excluded variables. In Model 3 we therefore include total unemployment, UT, instead of 
open unemployment, and expand the wage equation with the program participation rate, 
LMP. The results for Model 3 in Table 2 show that the estimates of total unemployment 
are close to the corresponding estimates of open unemployment. The short run effect of 
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the program participation rate is negative whereas the long run effect is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. Most important, the estimates of the SD dummy variable and 
the interaction term are both unaffected by the re-specification of the manufacturing wage 
equation. 
 
Other characteristics of government 
A possible criticism could be that the SD dummy variable acts as a proxy for government 
strength. If this interpretation is correct, other variables likely to reflect government 
strength should appear in the wage equation and eventually make the effect of the SD 
dummy variable small and insignificant. We therefore included a set of dummy variables 
representing minority/majority and coalition/non-coalition governments. However, these 
variables were far from having significant effects, and the estimates of both SOC and the 
interaction term, ( )3t tSOC u u−× − , were almost entirely unaffected.11 
 
5.  Concluding comments 
  
A neglected feature of countries with relatively centralized wage bargaining system is the 
close ties between the trade union movement and the SD political parties. The paper 
provides a study of the empirical relevance of this relationship for Norway and suggests 
that having a SD central government significantly reduces wage growth and makes wages 
more responsive to labour market conditions. We argue that these two findings are 
consistent with a wage bargaining model augmented by political preferences of union 
                                                 
11 A test of the null hypothesis that all dummies for government strength were equal to zero returned at p-
value of 0.85. 
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leaders and it suggest that the ability of bargaining coordination to offset the adverse 
affect of trade unions depends on the political regime. 
 
The finding that political colour of the government affects the impact of unemployment 
on wages is of particular interest since it implies that that the economy’s own ability to 
absorb short and medium run shocks is higher under a SD central government. Moreover, 
the combination of a downward level effect of SD governments and more wage 
flexibility suggest that such governments may generate lower equilibrium unemployment 
than right-wing governments. 
 
Finally, the analysis provides fresh evidence on the stability in the relationship between 
wages and political colour of the government as it extends the data used in earlier 
published work with nearly a decade with unusual high variation in wage growth, 
inflation and unemployment. The results show that the relationship between wages and 
political colour of the government is remarkably robust with respect to this extension.  
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Appendix A: Data definitions and sources 
All economic data are taken from RIMINI, the quarterly model used in Norges Bank 
(The Central Bank of Norway). The data are seasonally unadjusted. 
 
W = wage cost per hour in the manufacturing industry.  
P = factor income deflator for the manufacturing industry. 
PR = labour productivity in the manufacturing industry. Computed as value added at 
constant prices per hour worked. 
CPI= consumer price index. 
NH = normal working time 
U = open unemployment rate. Computed as the number of openly unemployed divided 
by the labour force. 
UT = total unemployment rate. Computed as the number of openly unemployed pluss 
participants on labour market programmes divided by labour force. 
LMP = participation rate. Computed as the number of participants on labour market 
programmes divided by total unemployment. 
STOP = composite dummy variable for wage freeze and wage regulation law. Equal to 1 
in 1979:1 – 1979:4, 1988:1 – 1988:4, 0.5 in 1989:1 – 1989:4, and 0 otherwise. 
SOC = dummy variable equal to 1 when there is a social democratic government, 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable is equal to 1 1971:2 – 1972:3, 1973:4 – 1981:3, 1986:3 – 
1989:3, 1996:4 – 1997:3, 2000:2 – 2000:4.
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Table 1: Estimated effects of SOC and ( )t-3SOC × u -u  
Model SOC ( )3tSOC u u−× −
Maintained -0.012 (3.35) - 
 
Model 1 -0.010 (4.16) - 
 
Model 2 -0.010 (4.54) -0.018 (4.93) 
 
Model 2 without income policy dummies -0.012 (5.37) -0.017 (4.41) 
 
Model 2 with 12 separate income policy 
dummies 
-0.011 (5.10) -0.017 (4.93) 
Model 2 1968:1 – 1991:4 -0.013 (3.70) -0.023 (4.78) 
 
Model 3 (total unemployment and program 
participation rate) 
-0.010 (4.47) -0.017 (4.51) 
 
Notes: Estimation period is 1968:1 – 2000:4 unless otherwise noted. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2: Detailed results 1968:1 – 2000:4 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
4 1tw −Δ  0.315 (6.04) 0.244  (4.90) 0.228 (4.36)
4 tpΔ  0.107 (2.73) 0.077  (2.10) 0.093 (2.48)
4 tprΔ  0.114 (2.84) 0.137  (3.71) 0.158 (3.87)
4 4tpr −Δ  -0.114 (2.88) -0.122  (3.40) -0.125 (3.29)
4 1tcpi −Δ  0.385 (7.26) 0.259  (7.37) 0.345 (6.93)
4 tnhΔ  -0.684 (7.26) -0.759  (8.69)  -0.721 (8.15)
( ) 4tw p pr −− −  -0.302 (9.04) -0.330 (10.62) -0.348 (9.51)
( ) 4tcpi p −−  0.063 (1.88) 0.130  (3.86) 0.124 (2.83)
3tu −  -0.017 (4.70) -0.014  (4.07)
2
1tU
−
−  0.006 (2.80) 0.009  (4.29)
3tut −  -0.016 (3.68)
2
1tUT
−
−  0.012 (2.76)
tlmpΔ  -0.010 (1.77)
1tlmp −Δ  -0.008 (1.62)
3tlmp −  0.008 (1.55)
tSTOP  -0.018 (3.65) -0.019  (4.25) -0.021 (4.17)
tSOC  -0.010 (4.16) -0.010  (4.52) -0.010 (4.47)( )3t tSOC u u−× −  -0.018  (4.93)
( )3tSOC ut ut−× −  -0.017 (4.51)
Diagnostics: 
σ  0.0123 0.0113 0.0114
Restr F(35,78)=0.89 [0.64] - -
AR 1-5 F(5,112)=2.84 [0.02] F(5,111)=1.85 [0.11] F(5,108)=2.16 [0.06]
Normality ( )2 2χ =1.09 [0.58] ( )2 2χ =3.04 [0.22] ( )2 2χ =0.67 [0.71]
Heteroscedastisity F(25,91)=1.42 [0.11] F(27,88)=1.34 [0.16] F(33,79)=1.16 [0.59]
Notes: Estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. 
 26
1990 1995 2000
-.02
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03 Res1Step
1990 1995 2000
.25
.5
.75
1
1.25
      5% 1up CHOWs
1990 1995 2000
.25
.5
.75
1
      5% Ndn CHOWs
1990 1995 2000
.25
.5
.75
1
      5% Nup CHOWs
 
Figure 1: Recursive constancy statistics, Model 2 
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Figure 2: Recursively estimated coefficient with +/- 2 estimated standard errors, 
Model 2 
